THE 2010 AMENDMENTS TO KENTUCKY'S BUSINESS ENTITY LAWS

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The 2010 General Assembly adopted a number of amendments, most of which are of a technical nature, to Kentucky’s business entity laws. This series of amendments is less systematic and of a narrower scope than the across-the-board amendments adopted by the 2007 General Assembly.1 Still, a series of amendments were adopted across the business entity laws intended to overrule aspects of the Kentucky Court of Appeal’s ruling in Barone v. Perkins.

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**Legislative History**

S.B. 150, containing the 2010 amendments to the business entity laws, was introduced by Senator Tom Jensen on February 8, 2010, and the bill was on February 10 assigned to the Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the proposal on February 11, and the bill was passed out of Committee on a vote of ten yays and one nay. S.B. 150 was voted out of the Senate on February 24 on a vote of 38 yays and 0 nay. The proposal came before the House Judiciary Committee on March 10. After adoption of the L3C study amendment, the bill was voted out of Committee on a unanimous vote. The bill came before the House on March 24, where it was passed out by a vote of 96 yays and 2

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3 *See infra* notes 220 through 222 and accompanying text.

4 A proposed floor amendment would have, in a limited partnership governed by either KyULPA or KyRULPA, permitted a limited partner to withdraw from the limited partnership and receive a "pro rata distribution" of its assets upon a variety of basis including the limited partner's belief of fraud in the operation of the limited partnership. In effect, limited partnerships would have lost capital lock-in. This floor amendment was on March 23, 2010 withdrawn in the face of written objections from this author, Turney Berry and Professor David Kleinburger, the reporter for the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001).
nays. The Senate concurred on March 28 to certain technical corrections made on the House side, and voted the bill out on 36 yays and zero nays.

The amendments set forth in S.B. 150 have an effective date of July 15, 2010.5

**The Response to Barone v. Perkins**

The decision rendered by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in *Barone v. Perkins*, as it touches upon business entity law and specifically the rule of limited liability, may well and likely is dicta; that said, it is dangerous dicta and has for that reason been expressly overruled.

The facts of the *Barone v. Perkins* decision are relatively straightforward. Frank and Christine Barone retained Glen Perkins Custom Homes, LLC to build a personal residence. The home was built, but after closing the Perkins' identified a number of defects in the property. In response, they filed suit against Glenn Perkins and Edward Hacker, asserting claims for tort and breach of contract such as violation of applicable building codes.7 Shortly after filing their answer, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which motion was supported by affidavits attesting, inter alia, that neither of the named defendants had been involved with the various alleged deficiencies in the home and on that basis they could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for those alleged deficiencies. Barone objected to the motion for summary judgment, noting that no discovery had yet taken place, but submitted no affidavits or affirmative evidence in opposition to the motions filed. The court granted summary judgment, holding that based upon the affidavits submitted, neither Defendant had been involved in the alleged tortious

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5 *See KY. OP. ATT’Y GEN. 10-002 (2010).*


7 The decision notes but does not explain why neither the LLC nor various of the subcontractors involved in the complained-of work were not named as parties in the action. It is noted that, at the time the suit was filed the LLC was not in good standing with the Secretary of State, but that during the pendency of the action it was reinstated to good standing.
conduct and therefore could not be personally liable thereon. An appeal followed.

The Court of Appeals upheld the grant of summary judgment, holding that it was not premature. Rather, citing the standard of summary judgment under *Lewis v. B&R Corporation*\textsuperscript{8} and *Steelvest*,\textsuperscript{9} the Court of Appeals held that there would be no combination of facts by which the Plaintiffs could prevail. Had the Court of Appeals stopped at this point, it would have been unnecessary to modify Kentucky’s various business organization acts, and *Barone v. Perkins* would be yet another minor skirmish in the continuing war over the appropriate standard for summary judgment. However, and unfortunately for our purposes, the Court continued with its analysis to, on a substantive level, consider the scope of the limits of liability shield afforded by the LLC Act.\textsuperscript{10} The Court of Appeals referenced this language and held that, as Perkins and Hacker were at all times acting as members of the company, and not employees, they were, having committed no individual torts,\textsuperscript{11} immune from liability

\textsuperscript{8} 56 S.W.3d 432 (Ky. App. 2001).
\textsuperscript{9} 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
\textsuperscript{10} The Kentucky LLC Act, at KRS § 275.150(1), prior to its 2010 amendment, provided that:

Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section or as otherwise specifically set forth in other sections in this chapter, no member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company, including a professional limited liability company, shall be personally liable by reason of being a member, manager, employee, or agent of the limited liability company, under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, agency, or tribunal of any type, or in any other manner, in this or any other state, or on any other basis, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise. The status of a person as a member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company, including a professional limited liability company, shall not subject the person to personal liability for the acts or omissions, including any negligence, wrongful act, or actionable misconduct, of any other member, manager, agent, or employee of the limited liability company.

\textsuperscript{11} This conclusion was based upon the affidavits submitted by Perkins and Hacker.
for the actions they had undertaken on behalf of the LLC. In the course of this discussion, the Court of Appeals contrasted the LLC Act with the Kentucky Business Corporation Act, noting that the latter includes an express statutory recognition that a shareholder otherwise enjoying limited liability may be personally liable “by reason of his own acts or misconduct.”

Relying upon the LLC Act’s lack of an equivalent statutory provision providing that a member of an LLC may be held personally liable for their own acts or conduct, the Court differentiated the liability shields provided by the two statutes holding, inter alia, that the liability shield provided by the LLC Act is more robust than that provided by the Business Corporation Act.

This differentiation by the Court of Appeals does not stand up to scrutiny. Section 6.22(2) of the Model Business Corporation Act is a repetition of generally applicable law to the effect that an agent, in the discharge of responsibilities on behalf of a principal, is always personally liable for their own tortious conduct. While it is true that the Court of Appeals...

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12 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.6-220(2). This provision of the Kentucky Business Corporation Act is a verbatim adoption of Section 6.22(2) of the Model Business Corporation Act, and provides:

Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation shall not be personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.


An agent is subject to liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s tortious conduct. Unless an applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains subject to liability although the actor acts as an agent or an employee, with actual or implied authority, or within the scope of employment.

As set forth in Comment b to the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01:

The justification for this basic rule is that a person is responsible for the legal consequences of torts committed by that person. A tort committed by an agent constitutes a wrong to the tort’s victim independently of the capacity in which the agent committed the tort. The injury suffered by the victim of a tort is regardless of whether the tortfeasor acted independently or happened to be acting as an agent or employee of another person.
Appeals, in reliance upon the findings of fact of the trial court, noted that the defendants had not been personally engaged in any tortious conduct, the differentiation between the statutes as to the presence or absence of language addressing liability for one's "own acts or conduct" must relate to liability arising in tort; assuming the corporation is properly disclosed as the principal, the agent will not be held liable on a contract entered into by the agent on behalf of the principal.\textsuperscript{14} This effort at distinguishing between the LLC and Business Corporation Acts is especially troubling because the LLC Act expressly incorporates "the principles of law and equity,"\textsuperscript{15} which includes the law of agency.

Also curious is the effort by the Court of Appeals to characterize Perkins and Hacker, the members of the LLC, as "members" versus "employees." Each being a member of the LLC, in almost every circumstance, each will be characterized as a member by default in that it will not be possible for them to be characterized as an employee.\textsuperscript{16} Even

\textit{See also Brewer Machine \& Conveyor Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Old National Bank, 248 F.R.D. 478, 482 (W.D. Ky. 2008) ("It is commonly recognized that an agent is responsible for his own tortious acts, notwithstanding the agency relationship and regardless of whether the principal is also liable. Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 7.01 (2006).")); Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1989) ("the agent of a corporation, albeit a principal shareholder and officer of the corporation, is personally liable for a tort committed by him although he was acting for the corporation."); Peters v. Frey, 429 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Ky. 1968)); Young v. Vista Homes, Inc., 243 S.W.3d 352; 363 (Ky. App. 2007) ("an agent or corporate officer is not immune from liability for his own intentional misconduct or for negligence based upon a breach of his own duty.") (citations omitted).}

\textsuperscript{14} See \textit{RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY} § 6.01 (2006).

\textsuperscript{15} KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.003.

\textsuperscript{16} See, e.g., TREAS. REG. § 301.7701-2(c)(iv)(A) (while liability for trust fund taxes on compensatory payments made to a non-member employee of a single member LLC will be a liability of the LLC, payments to the member are self-employment income and liability for trust fund taxes thereon is personal to the member); REv. RUL. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256 (a bona fide partner in a partnership is not an "employee" of the partnership for purposes of FICA, FUTA and withholding obligation or "under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer - employee relationship"); \textit{RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW} (Tentative Draft No. 2 (April 3, 2009)) § 1.03 ("Unless otherwise provided by law, an individual is not an employee of an enterprise if the individual through an ownership interest controls all or part of the enterprise."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.012(1) (a "qualified member" of an LLC,
then, how the liability shield of the LLC Act would be applied differently between those two characterizations is not explained, especially as it encompasses any "member, manager, employee or agent of" an LLC. In addition, because the Perkins LLC was member-managed, each of Perkins and Hacker were, in the ordinary course of its business, imbued with apparent agency authority on behalf of the LLC.

In response to the Barone Court's differentiation of the limited liability between that provided in the Business Corporation Act versus the LLC Act, and its reliance upon the express statutory language incorporating the general rule set forth in agency law, the limited liability provision of the LLC Act, as well as the equivalent provisions of the Kentucky Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2006), the Kentucky

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17 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.150(1).
18 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.135(1).
19 The LLC Act has been revised by adding a new subsection (3) to KRS § 275.150 providing that the general rule of limited liability "shall not affect the liability of a member, manager, employee or agent of a [LLC] for his own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct." This addition, which reflects the law of an authorized agent's responsibility for his or her conduct, should be distinguished from the liability imposed on a purported agent when acting on behalf of a non-existent principal or outside the scope of the agent's actual authority, both addressed at KRS § 275.095. It bears noting that the over broad reading by the Barone Court of the absence in KRS § 275.150 of language equivalent to KRS § 271B.6-220(2) was avoided in J. Stan Dev., LLC v. Lindo, No. 2008-CA-001796-MR, 2009 WL 3878084 (Ky. App. Nov. 20, 2009) and Dzurilla v. All American Homes, LLC, 2010 WL 55923 at *3 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 2010).
20 The amendments to KyULPA (2006) are made in two sections, namely the addition of KRS § 362.2-303(2) and KRS § 362.2-404(4), addressing, respectively, the liability shield afforded all limited partnerships in a KyULPA limited partnership and as well the general partners in a KyULPA limited partnership that is elected to be a limited liability limited partnership. The presence of a provision of this nature in KyRUPA at the time of its adoption was a carry-forward from the predecessor LLP act. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.1-306(4), id. § 362.220(3); see also Allan W. Vestal and Thomas E. Rutledge, Modern Partnership Law Comes to Kentucky: Comparing the Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Act from which it was Derived, 95 KY. L.J. 715, 731, note 103 and accompanying text (2006-07).
Cooperatives and Associations Act, the Rural Electric & Telephone Cooperative Act, and the Kentucky Nonprofit Corporation Act have all been revised to incorporate the rule of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Agency section 7.01 as already embodied in KRS section 271B.6-220(2).

These statutory recognitions that one is subject to liability for their own torts do not modify duties inter-se the various business organizations. Just as the “except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or misconduct” language of KRS § 271B.6-220(2) does not either limit or modify the director’s standard of culpability for breach of the standard of care, the addition of equivalent language in the other acts does not modify the responsibilities inter-se the venture. To that end, the addition of Restatement section 7.01 language to, for example, the LLC Act does not modify the standard of culpability for a breach of the duty of care, impact upon the ability to modify (or even eliminate) that duty of care or culpability for its violation or otherwise create a basis for liability.

21 In the Cooperatives and Associations Act, a series of amendments were necessary. First, subsection (3) of KRS § 272.201 has been deleted and replaced with a new section KRS § 272.203, created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 3. That new KRS § 272.203, patterned upon KRS § 271B.6-220, provides the rule of limited liability and as well the rule that a member or other person acting on behalf of an association is liable for consequences of his or her own actions. In addition, a new subsection (2) has been added to § 272.490, that subsection repeating the rule of KRS § 271B.6-220. See 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 14.

22 Sections 279.090 and 279.390 of KRS have been revised to incorporate language based upon KRS § 271B.6-220(2). See 2010 Acts, ch. 133, §§ 47, 48.

23 In the Nonprofit Corporation Act, KRS § 273.187 has been redrafted to restate the rule of limited liability while, at the same time, repeating the rule of personal liability for one’s own conduct. See 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 15.

24 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-300(5).


26 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(1).

27 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.180(1).
**Bringing Suit on Behalf of an LLC**

KRS section 375.335 recites who has the authority to initiate a legal action on behalf of and in the name of an LLC. KRS section 375.340 provided that the determination that there was not proper authority to initiate an action on behalf of an LLC may not be "asserted as a defense to an action brought by the LLC or as the basis for the LLC to bring a subsequent suit in the same cause of action." KRS section 275.340 has caused mischief in that it is being applied in a manner not intended, and for that reason it has been deleted.

The rationales for this provision were twofold. The first was to preclude an LLC, having not prevailed in an action brought in its name, to assert that it was not bound by the action and thereby avoid issues of res judicata, collateral estoppel, law of the case, claim preclusion, etc. Second, it was intended that the defendants in an action brought by an LLC not be able to have the action dismissed due to a lack of authority, necessitating that the LLC take whatever steps that are thereafter necessary to in fact authorize the action, during which time the statute of limitations on the claim may have run or the defendant may have otherwise come into additional defenses.

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28 The authority to bring an action on behalf of an LLC may be expanded or restricted in the operating agreement. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.335 ("Unless otherwise provided in a written operating agreement"). In *Maitland v. Int. Registries, LLC*, 2008 WL 2440521 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2008), the 50% member of an LLC filed suit against the LLC; the other member sought, on behalf of the LLC, to retain counsel and defend the suit. The operating agreement in question provided that "the decision of the members holding a majority of the LLC interest as to all such matters shall be controlling." On that basis, the court determined that the second member did not have the authority to retain counsel on behalf of the LLC. In *Ward v. Hornik*, 2002 WL 1199249 (E.D.Pa. June 3, 2002), a complaint authorized by members holding 64% of the voting interests was dismissed when the operating agreement required two-thirds of the voting interests to take action.

29 KRS § 275.340 is based upon Section 1103 of the Prototype Limited Liability Company Act, the primary source document for the original 1994 Kentucky LLC Act. See infra notes 113 and 139. The official comment to Prototype § 1102 (KRS § 275.345) provides in part "Section 1103 provides for the consequences of unauthorized suits vis-à-vis third parties."
This statute has seen its application not vis-à-vis actions between the LLC and third parties, but rather inter-se the members. In *Lourdes Medical Pavilion, LLC v. Catholic Health Care Partners, Inc.* the operating agreement at issue required the consent of both members to the initiation of legal action on behalf of the LLC. One member, in their own name as well as in the name of the LLC, brought an action against the other member. The Court found that, in bringing the action, the one member was acting outside the bounds of the operating agreement. However, based upon KRS section 275.340, the Court determined that the action should not be dismissed notwithstanding the lack of actual authority in the one member to bring suit on behalf of the LLC against the other member. In doing so the *Lourdes* court eviscerated KRS section 275.335 and ignored the “maximum enforcement of operating agreements” directive of KRS section 275.003. To avoid this and similar results, KRS section 275.340 has been deleted from the LLC Act. Actual authority to bring an action on behalf of an LLC will continue to be determined under the operating agreement and KRS section 275.335, and questions as to whether the action has been properly authorized and whether the LLC is bound by any determination rendered will be made under generally applicable principles of law.

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31 Although not an issue in this decision, it must be wondered whether the defendant member had a viable cause of action against the plaintiff member for breach of the operating agreement and, if so, what would be the damages.

32 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.335 (reciting who may bring suit on behalf of an LLC and making that authority subject to a contrary rule in a written operating agreement).

33 At the time of the *Lourdes* decision, the “maximum enforcement of operating agreements” language was codified at KRS § 275.015(14). See also Rutledge, *The 2007 Amendments, supra* note 1 at 260.

34 See 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 77.

35 In this respect, the deletion of KRS § 275.340 from the LLC Act does not create a gap in the Act. None of the KyBCA, KyRUPA, KyULPA, KyNPCA or the other business organization acts contains a provision equivalent to KRS § 275.340. With respect to the determination, in the context of a non-profit corporation, that there was not authority to initiate legal action in the name of the corporation, see *Covington Housing*
Limits on Distributions by Limited Liability Partnerships

The various acts that provide limited liability to the owners also provide limits on the distributions that may be made to the members, preserving the concept of the “trust fund” to insure that assets remain available to satisfy the claims of more senior creditors. A notable exception to this rule has been the limited liability partnership provisions that exist in the Kentucky Uniform Partnership Act and the Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2006) since neither of these acts provide limitations upon distributions that may be made. Both the Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2006) and the Kentucky Uniform Partnership Act have been revised by the addition of limitations on distributions that may be made when the LLP is insolvent. Each provides a two-year “look back” period for recovery from the persons authorizing an improper distribution. A provision of this nature, while not set forth in the

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36 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.6-400(3); id. § 275.225(i); id. § 362.473 and id. § 362.2-508. See also BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 46 (3rd ed.), citing Wood v. Dummer, 30 F.Cas. 435 (No. 17,944) (C.C.D. Me. 1824); In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983); Bear, Inc. v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 137, 146 (Ky. App. 2010), quoting Reeves v. East Cairo Ferry Co., 158 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ky. 1942).

37 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.6-400(3); id. § 275.225; id. § 362.473 and id. § 362.2-508.

38 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.555; id. § 362.220(2).


40 Absent an election to be an LLP there is no need for a provision limiting distributions; a creditor claim is enforceable against the partners. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.220(1); id. § 362.1-306(1).


42 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.601(2); 362.1-1003(2). Accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §271B.8-330(3); id. § 275.230(3); id. § 362.2-509(4). See also Wilson v.
uniform act, has been added by a number of other states, most recently Ohio in its 2008 adoption of RUPA.43

**Effect of the Dissolution of an LLC**

The provision addressing the effect of the dissolution of an LLC44 has been both clarified and corrected. As to the clarification, subsection (3)(d) provided that dissolution did not change a number of individual rules of the operating agreement45 or the Act.46 Such a selective listing, however, raised the question as to whether items not listed are altered by dissolution. The revised language states, in addition to what was previously set forth, that dissolution does not, unless the operating agreement provides to the contrary, amend the operating agreement.47 It is further made express that dissolution does not of itself terminate capital contribution obligations previously undertaken.48

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44 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.300.

45 For example, it was stated that quorum requirements are not altered. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.300(3)(d). Any quorum requirements must arise from the operating agreement as the LLC Act is silent as to quorum.

46 For example, the standards applicable to members and managers, presumably referring to at minimum KRS § 275.170 and KRS § 275.185(3). See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.300(3)(c).

47 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.300(3)(d), as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 29. This clarification needs to be understood in the context of the rules that an LLC exists after its dissolution (see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.300(2)) and that the dissolution does not affect a member’s disassociation from the LLC. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.280.

48 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.300(3)(d), as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 39. This provision is in partial affirmance of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in
As to correction, all of KRS section 275.300 was prefaced with "unless otherwise provided in a written operating agreement," thereby implying that it set forth only default rules that are subject to private ordering. However, certain of the substantive provisions, such as the restriction of a dissolved LLC to those activities "appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs"^{49} and providing that pending actions are not abated by dissolution^{50} are clearly not subject to contrary private ordering. Therefore, the section has been revised to provide greater clarity as to those provisions that are subject to private ordering; subsections (1) and (3) are expressly subject to modification in a written operating agreement while subsections (2) and (4) are not.

Foreign Limited Partnerships Transacting Business in Kentucky

Addressing a lacuna in the Kentucky Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2006), a new section has been added thereto addressing the consequences to a foreign limited partnership that is transacting business in Kentucky without having qualified to do so^{51} and providing that the limited partnership may not, until such time as it procures a certificate of authority, maintain an action or proceeding.


49 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.300(2).


51 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.2-911, created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 6. This provision conforms to KRS §§ 362.507, 362.1-1103, 275.390 and 271B.15-020. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001), 6A U.L.A. 325 (2008), is silent as to the consequences of a foreign limited partnership transacting business without authority. From 2007, the foreign qualification provisions of KyRULPA were repealed (see 2007 Acts, ch. 137, § 181) and all foreign limited partnerships qualify under KyULPA. See also Rutledge, The 2007 Amendments, supra note 1 at 235. In Modern Motors, LLC v. Yelder, No. 2009-CA-000648-MR (Ky. App. Jan. 29, 2010), the court held that KRS § 275.390(1), upon which new KRS § 362.2-911(1) is based, does not bar the filing of a compulsory counterclaim even though a compulsory counterclaim is not itself a defense.
Notwithstanding the inability of a foreign limited partnership to maintain an action if it has been transacting business without having qualified to do so,\textsuperscript{52} it is expressly provided that this failure does not impair the validity or the contracts or acts of the limited partnership or preclude it from defending an action in Kentucky,\textsuperscript{53} and it as well expressly provided that the personal liability of a partner (including both general and limited partners) is not impaired by the failure to qualify.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Administrative Dissolution}

A corporation, LLC or other business entity may be administratively dissolved for failure to maintain a registered agent or a registered office.\textsuperscript{55} Before its amendment in 2007, KyBCA called for the Secretary of State to mail notice of administrative dissolution to the registered agent at the registered office address. In effect, the Secretary of State was providing notice to an address that, being invalid, was the precipitating reason for the notice. In 2007 the KyBCA was amended to provide that the Secretary of State would send notice of administrative dissolution of a corporation to the principal place of business address.\textsuperscript{56} Similar amendments have now been made across the KyBCA (now addressing as well revocation of authority\textsuperscript{57}), the KyNPCA,\textsuperscript{58} the LLC

\textsuperscript{52} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.2-911(1), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 6. Accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.15-020(1); id. § 275.390(1); and id. § 362.1-1103(1).


\textsuperscript{55} See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.14-200(2); id. §§ 275.295(1), (2); id. § 362.2-809(1)(b).

\textsuperscript{56} See also Rutledge, The 2007 Amendments, supra note 1 at 256.


Act\textsuperscript{59} and KyULPA.\textsuperscript{60} With these amendments, notice of any administrative dissolution or revocation of a certificate of authority\textsuperscript{61} will be sent to the business entities’ principal office address.\textsuperscript{62} Needless to say, these revisions make it more incumbent (it was already mandated by statute)\textsuperscript{63} that business entities keep the principal address records up to date.

A provision has been added addressing the dissolution of a nonprofit corporation upon reaching the end of its life as defined in the articles of incorporation.\textsuperscript{64} A corporation that has reached the end of its duration as defined in its articles of incorporation is afforded sixty days from that date within which to amend or delete that date, thereby curing the dissolution.\textsuperscript{65} However, after sixty days, the corporation may not be reinstated and must proceed to liquidate its business and affairs. This addition is consistent with revisions made in 2007 to the KyBCA and KyLLCA.\textsuperscript{66} As further amended, all of the KyBCA, the KyLLCA and the


\textsuperscript{60} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.2-907 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 68.

\textsuperscript{61} Or in the case of a foreign LLP qualified to transact business under KRS § 362.1-1102, a statement of foreign qualification.

\textsuperscript{62} In the case of a notice of administrative dissolution of a limited partnership governed by KyULPA, the notice will be sent to the designated office. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.2-809(2) as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 64.

\textsuperscript{63} See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.040 (“A [LLC] that changes the mailing address of its principal office \textit{shall} deliver to the Secretary of State ... a statement of change ....”) (emphasis added); \textit{id.} § 362.2-115(1) (“In order to change its designated office, registered office or agent for service of process, a limited partnership or a foreign limited partnership \textit{shall} deliver to the Secretary of State for filing a statement of change....”) (emphasis added); \textit{id.} § 271B.5-025 (“A corporation that changes the mailing address of its principal office \textit{shall} delivery to the Secretary of State for filing, on a form supplied by the Secretary of State, a statement of change ....”) (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{64} KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273.3182(4), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 20.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.} Effective January 1, 2011 this provision was superseded as to its substance by KRS § 14A.8-050, created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 39.

\textsuperscript{66} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.14-220(5); \textit{id.} § 275.295(2)(b); \textit{see also} Rutledge, \textit{The 2007 Amendments}, supra note 1 at 247-48.
KyNPCA provide that the Secretary of State is not under an obligation, at the time an entity reaches the end of its period of duration, to send notice of its dissolution.67 Consequent to this clarification, it may not be argued that notice from the Secretary of State is a precondition to the dissolution of the organization upon reaching the period of duration as set forth in its organic filing.

Another revision made across the various acts deals with the timing of transmission of a notice of administrative dissolution or revocation of a certificate of authority. Annual reports are due by June 30 of each year.68 Previously the statutes provided that after sixty days had elapsed from that due date, notice of administrative dissolution or of revocation of the certificate of authority would be mailed. That notice then triggered a sixty day cure period.69 Under the revised statutes, the Secretary of State, as of immediately after the annual report due date of June 30, may mail notices of administrative dissolution and revocation of the certificate of authority.70 The sixty day cure period is not impacted by these revisions.

*The Professional Service Corporation Act*

Several revisions have been made to the Professional Service Corporation Act. Revisions made in KRS section 274.017(1) are grammatical in nature, although the revision to KRS section 274.017(1)(d) serves to make clear that the requirement that the professional service be

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68 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.16-220(3); id. § 275.190(3); id. § 362.2-210(3); id. § 362.1-121(3); id. § 273.3671(3) and id. § 295(2)(a) and id. § 275.445(2). Effective January 1, 2011; the provision addressing the due date for annual reports will be KRS § 14A.6-010(4).

69 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.15-310(2); id. § 271B.14-210(2); id. § 275.295(2)(b) and id. § 275.445(2).

70 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.14-200(1) as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 7; id. § 271B.15-310(1), as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 11. Effective January 1, 2011 this provision was superseded as to its substance by KRS § 14A.7-050(1)(a) as created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 35.
permitted by the articles of incorporation applies both to the corporation at issue as well as a corporation seeking to be a shareholder therein. The revisions to KRS section 274.017(2) serve to confirm the ruling in *National Loan Investors, L.P. v. Retina Assoc., P.S.C.*,\(^{71}\) wherein it was held that, notwithstanding an otherwise valid pledge agreement of the stock in a PSC, a non-professional could not exercise on that pledge and take ownership of the shares in that they are not a “qualified person.”\(^{72}\)

The revisions to what was KRS section 274.245(1), dealing with foreign professional service corporations seeking to qualify to transact business in Kentucky, clarify that the qualified shareholder requirement is to be applied as if the foreign corporation were itself incorporated in Kentucky. The deletion of KRS section 274.245(2) serves to make clear that the rules applicable to whether or not a foreign professional service corporation must qualify to do business will be done under the same terms as are applied to foreign business corporations in general,\(^{73}\) and the prior exception from qualification if no office is maintained in Kentucky will no longer apply.

Although implicit in the Professional Service Corporation Act,\(^{74}\) it has now been made express that the rules applicable to business corporations in general, including shareholder limited liability, also apply to professional service corporations subject, of course, to the PSC’s retention of certain supervisory liability and as well other applicable rules of personal liability under professional regulatory rules.\(^{75}\) Notwithstanding the internal affairs doctrine, with respect to services

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rendered in Kentucky, Kentucky law as it relates to shareholder liability will apply equally to the actors on behalf of a foreign PSC.\textsuperscript{76}

A new provision expressly authorizes a PSC that is no longer rendering professional services to delete the PSC provisions from its articles of incorporation and thereafter be governed solely by KRS ch. 271B.\textsuperscript{77}

\textit{The Assumed Name Act}

Minor revisions have been made to the assumed name act to add greater clarity as to what constitutes the real name of a foreign business trust or foreign not-for-profit corporation and to add the obviously missing “certificate” in KRS section 365.015(6).\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{The Consequences of Defaulting on Obligations Undertaken in an Operating or Partnership Agreement}

Each of the LLC Act, KyRUPA and KyULPA contemplate that there may be obligations to make additional capital contributions in the future, or to make or perform other obligations.\textsuperscript{79} The LLC Act provides that those obligations are enforceable only if set forth in writing;\textsuperscript{80} no similar statute of frauds is set forth in the partnership or limited partnership acts.\textsuperscript{81} Each of these acts has now been supplemented to

\textsuperscript{76} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.055(4), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 26.


\textsuperscript{78} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.015, as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 71.

\textsuperscript{79} Indeed, it is possible to issue corporate shares that are assessable, the constitutional prohibition thereon having been removed in 2002, but that practice is at best atypical.

\textsuperscript{80} KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.200(1). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.150(1). Neither KyRUPA nor KyULPA require that a partner’s contribution obligation be set forth in writing. See KY. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 362.1-306(1), (3); id. § 362.2-404(1).

\textsuperscript{81} See also Thomas E. Rutledge, The Statute of Frauds and Partnership/Operating Agreements, 11 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 33 (Nov./Dec. 2008).
provide that the operating/partnership agreement may specify the penalties or consequences of a failure to satisfy an otherwise enforceable obligation, the statute setting forth a non-exclusive list of the penalties/consequences to which the parties may agree. 82 In each instance, the language adopted is based upon that of the Delaware LLC Act. 83 With these additions, there should be laid to rest the argument that Man-O-War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin, 84 which was overridden in 2002 as to corporations by the amendment of KRS section 271B.6-270, 85 may remain still applicable to LLCs and business organizations other than corporations 86 notwithstanding the freedom of contract principles embodied in these acts. 87


83 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-502(c). Other jurisdictions with similar provisions include Ohio. See OHIO CODE § 1776.24.

84 932 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1996).


87 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.003(1) (“It shall be the policy of the Commonwealth through this chapter to give maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract and the enforceability of operating agreements.”); id. § 362.1-104(3) (“Subject to KRS 362.1-103(2), it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth through this subchapter to give maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract and the enforceability of partnership agreements.”); id. § 362.2-107(3) (“Subject to KRS 362.2-110(2), it shall be the public policy of the Commonwealth in this chapter to give maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract and the enforceability of partnership agreements.”).
**Charging Orders**

Further revisions\(^1\) have been made to the various charging order provisions. Initially, that in Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act (KyRUPA)\(^2\) has been revised to make it clear that a transferee benefits from exemption laws as would a partner,\(^3\) and that in the LLC Act has been revised for grammar and terminology. Next, the charging order provisions of KyRUPA, KyULPA and the LLC Act have been supplemented to address procedural issues for their issuance and service, making express that (a) the LLC/partnership is not a necessary party to the application for a charging order\(^4\) and (b) that service of the charging order on the LLC or partnership may be made by the court or as it should direct.\(^5\) Last, the charging order provisions of KyUPA\(^6\) and KyRULPA\(^7\) have been deleted and there have been substituted in place thereof the language employed in, respectively, KyRUPA and KyULPA.\(^8\) With these revisions, the rights of the holder of

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\(^1\) In 2007, significant revisions were made to the charging order provisions of the LLC Act (KRS § 275.260), KyRUPA (KRS § 362.1-504) and KyULPA (KRS § 362.2-703). See Rutledge, The 2007 Amendments, supra note 1 at 252-53.

\(^2\) KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.1-504(6). This revision brought the charging order provision of KyRUPA fully into accord with the charging order provision of the LLC Act (KRS § 275.265(5)) and KyULPA (KRS § 362.2-703(5)).

\(^3\) Accord Cadle Co. v. Ginsburg, 2002 WL 725500 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002). This determination is in opposition to what has been suggested to be the norm, namely that the entity is entitled to notice of the application for the charging order. See J. Gordon Gose, The Charging Order Under the Uniform Partnership Act, 28 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19 (Feb. 1953). Left unresolved is whether either or both of the LLC/partnership and the other members/partners are entitled to notice of and participation in any proceeding for further relief in the form of foreclosure. See, e.g., 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG AND LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 3.05(d)(3)(iv) at n. 112 (suggesting that partnership and other partners are entitled to notice and to be heard).

\(^4\) See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.260(6) as created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 35; id. § 362.1-504(7) as created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 56; id. § 362.2-703(7) as created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 63.

\(^5\) KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.285.

\(^6\) KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.481.

\(^7\) See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.285 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 49; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.481 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 50. As to the charging order generally, see Thomas E. Rutledge, Charging Orders: Some of What You Ought to Know (Part I), 9 J. PASSINGTHROUGH ENTITIES 15 (Mar./Apr. 2006); (Part II), 9 J.
a charging order are the same irrespective of the statute governing the LLC or partnership in question. This redrafting of the KyRULPA charging order for consistency with that in KyUPA serves also to avoid questions as to whether or not the latter applies in KyRULPA limited partnerships.

The Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance

The doctrine of independent legal significance has been expressly incorporated into the KyBCA, the KyLLCA, KyRUPA and KyULPA. Under the doctrine of independent legal significance:

PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 21 (Jul./Aug. 2006). In contrast with Nevada, (see N.R.S. § 78.746) Kentucky has not sought to include a charging provision in its business corporation act. See also Thomas E. Rutledge, Nevada’s Corporate Charging Order: Less There Than Meets the Eye, 11 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 21 (Mar./Apr. 2008).

For example, while the charging order provisions of KyUPA and KyRULPA were previously silent as to whether or not the charging order was the exclusive means by which the judgment creditor could move against the partnership interest, such is now express in both of those acts. In Olmstead v. Federal Trade Commission, ____ So.3d ____ (2010 WL 2518106) (Fla. June 24, 2010), that Court compared the charging order provision of the Florida LLC Act, which does not contain exclusivity language, with those in Florida’s adoptions of RUPA and ULPA(2001), which do state they are exclusive. Holding that the distinction is meaningful, the Court held that generally applicable collection provisions were not barred by the LLC Act’s charging order provision and that an order to the sole member of an LLC to surrender all right, title and interest therein was permissible. All the acts now use the (seemingly) permissive “may,” as contrasted with a mandatory “shall,” as to the court’s capacity to issue a charging order. This word accommodates the application of exemptions that may apply, but is not intended to otherwise require an evidentiary hearing to require, for example, the judgment creditor proving the judgment debtor to be a partner/member of the partnership/LLC to which the charging order is directed or that the partnership/LLC generates distributable income that will, pursuant to the charging order, be diverted in satisfaction of the judgment.


See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.1-430, created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 1; id. § 275.003(5), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 28; id. § 362.1-104(5), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 52; and id. § 362.2-107(4), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 59. The failure to incorporate the rule of independent legal significance into the statutes
Action taken in accordance with different sections of that law are acts of independent legal significance even though the end result may be the same under different sections. 98

This doctrine finds application in circumstances where the effect of a transaction may be accomplished in either of two or more manners that have different procedural or substantive requirements. If the requirements of one "path" are satisfied, the transaction is valid notwithstanding that the requirements of another path are not satisfied. For example, consider an LLC owned 60%/20%/20% whose operating agreement requires the consent of 80% of the members for its amendment. The 60% member convenes a meeting of the members to consider a merger of the LLC into another LLC – the first LLC’s operating agreement is silent as to mergers and therefore the default of approval by a majority-in-interest of the members applies. 99 While the two 20% members vote against the transaction, the 60% member’s vote is sufficient to cause its approval. The members are now bound by the new operating agreement 100 and there is no right to dissent from the merger. 101 In response to the argument that from the perspective of the minority-members the "merger" was nothing but an amendment of the operating agreement for which 80% approval governing seldom used structures such as the business trust was simply an exercise in efficiency, and should not be interpreted as an indication that the doctrine, as a component of the common law, does not there apply.

98 Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 377 (Del. 1963). See also Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963), aff’g 182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962); Warner Communications, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 583 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1989) (referencing “Our bed rock doctrine of independent legal significance”), and Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vogue, 2002 W.L. 1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), aff’d sub. nom. Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Juniper Financial Corp., 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003); Ernest L. Folk, III, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REV. 1261 (Nov. 1963). In Lach v. Man O’War LLC, 256 S.W.3d 563 (2008), the plaintiff argued that the transaction undertaken was invalid as the effect was indistinguishable from a conversion for which the approval of the plaintiff would have been required. The Court rejected that argument of equivalency, but on other basis determined the transaction to have been improper.

99 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.350(1). This rule is subject to modification in a written operating agreement.

100 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.360(4).

101 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.345(3).
was not granted, the doctrine of independent legal significance would direct that the mere fact that the outcome is identical or similar does not mean it should be set aside. Rather, when a permitted path to the result is followed, that the requirements to another (and perhaps more direct or restrictive) path are not followed does not indicate that the action was inappropriate. 102 These amendments track certain Delaware revisions made in 2009. 103 While some may question whether such is the correct rule, 104 a different rule of construction may be provided for in the controlling documents. 105

102 The doctrine of independent legal significance applies inter-se the business entity and does not impact upon successor liability to third parties under cases such as American Railway Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 228 S.W. 433 (Ky. 1920), Comm. v. Fales Division of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987), Pearson v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2002) and Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co., 165 S.W.3d 474 (Ky. 2005).


105 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.003 ("it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth through this chapter to give maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract and the enforceability of operating agreements."); id. § 362.1-104(3) ("Subject to KRS 362.1-103(2), it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth through this subchapter to give maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract and the enforceability of partnership agreements."); id. § 362.2-107(3) ("Subject to KRS 362.2-110(2), it shall be the public policy of the Commonwealth in this subchapter to give maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract and the enforceability of partnership agreements.").
Member Resignation

Directors and officers of a corporation are fiduciaries to the corporation; absent truly extraordinary circumstances, they have a unilateral power to resign from those positions and thereby terminate their ongoing fiduciary obligations. General partners in a general or a limited partnership are fiduciaries (as well as mutual agents) of the partnership and the other partners; they enjoy a unilateral power to resign as general partners and thereby terminate their ongoing fiduciary obligations. Shareholders, qua shareholders, are not fiduciaries either to the corporation or to the other shareholders and have no right to resign. Absent extraordinary circumstances, limited partners in a limited partnership are not fiduciaries. While certain statutes have afforded them the power to resign, this power is based upon economics and not fiduciary law. Therefore, the general rule is that fiduciaries have the power to unilaterally withdraw from the office giving rise to the fiduciary obligations and thereby, prospectively, terminate those obligations.

The situation in Kentucky LLCs is different. Members in a member-managed LLC owe fiduciary obligations to either the LLC and

106 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30(a), 8.42(a)(3); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-300(1)(c); id. § 271B.8-420(1)(c).

107 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 345.

108 See, e.g., UPA § 21, 6 U.L.A. 194 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.250; RUPA § 404, 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.1-404; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-404(b), (c); ULPA § 408, 6A U.L.A. 439 (2008); and KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.2-408.

109 See, e.g., UPA § 31(1)(b), 6 U.L.A. 370 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.300(1)(b); RUPA § 601(a), 6 U.L.A. 163 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.1-601(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-601(i); IND. CODE § 23-16-7-2.

110 The inter-shareholder fiduciary obligation principles of cases following Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), and section 7.01(d) of the Principles of Corporate Governance are exceptional, aberrational and analytically flawed, but that is a discussion for another day.

111 See, e.g., RULPA § 603, 6B U.L.A. 286 (2008); IND. CODE. § 23-16-7-3.
the other members or at least to the LLC. While in a manager-managed LLC, the members, qua members, do not *ab initio* have fiduciary obligations to either the LLC or the other members, such obligations can arise by private ordering. What is atypical vis-à-vis other forms of organization is that members, qua members and as fiduciaries, do not have the unilateral power to terminate the position giving rise to those fiduciary obligations unless so provided in a written operating agreement. Absent a provision addressing the power to resign in a written operating agreement, a member desiring to resign from the LLC is at the mercy of the other members in order to be able to do so. Consider the case of a member in a plumbing repair company organized as an LLC. That member would like to resign and set up his own plumbing company (where, as we know, he will make far more money than he would as an attorney). As a member, he owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the LLC, and is therefore precluded from competing with the LLC. Assume the subject operating agreement is silent as to resignation. Therefore, that member is at the mercy of all the other members in the current LLC consenting (or not) to

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112 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(1) (duty of care obligations in an LLC are owed by members, absent private ordering to the contrary, to both the LLC and the other members); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(2) (duty of loyalty obligations of members in an LLC, absent private ordering to the contrary, are owed to the LLC); RULLCA § 409(b), 6B U.L.A. 488 (2008) (member’s duty of loyalty); RULLCA § 409(c), 6B U.L.A. 489 (2008) (member’s duty of loyalty).

113 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(4); accord RULLCA § 409(g)(1), 6B U.L.A. 489 (2008). As to the interpretation of KRS § 275.170(4), see Mitchell v. Smith, 2009 WL 891908 (D. Utah March 31, 2009) ("Because Defendant’s Counterclaim relies solely upon Plaintiff’s status as members [of the LLC] for the existence of fiduciary duties, and because Utah law prohibits such a finding based solely upon membership, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted."); Katris v. Carroll, 842 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App. 2005); ULQ, LLC v. Meder, 666 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. App. 2008); Leiford v. Smith, 618 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. App. 2005); Dragt v. Dragt/DeTray, LLC, 161 P.3d 473 (Wash. App. 2007). Whether a particular LLC is member-managed or manager-managed is not determined by a substantive review and characterization of the inter-se management structure defined in the operating agreement. Rather, for purposes of KRS § 275.170(4), reference is made to the election made in the articles of organization. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(1)(d). As set forth in the official commentary to the Prototype LLC Act § 401, “Irrespective of the provisions in the operating agreement, whether an LLC is ‘manager-managed,’ as that phrase is used in the Act, depends on whether the articles of organization so provide.”

114 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(2).
his departure and opening a competing business. If the member, not released as such by the other members, opens the competing venture, then (a) there is a manifest breach of the duty of loyalty and (b) the member is bound to turn over to the LLC all profits and benefits derived from the new venture.\textsuperscript{115} Understandably, from the perspective of that member desiring to open his own business, this is not a very tenable situation.

As adopted in 1994, the Kentucky LLC Act gave members the right, on 30 days prior written notice, to withdraw from the LLC and to receive the “fair value” of their limited liability company interests.\textsuperscript{116} At that time, LLCs had, as a default rule, minimal “capital lock-in.”\textsuperscript{117} This rule was merely a default, and could be modified in the written operating agreement. In 1998, the provision allowing a member to unilaterally withdraw from an LLC was deleted from the Kentucky LLC Act, and replaced by the following provision:

Unless otherwise provided in a written operating agreement, a member has no right to withdraw from a [LLC]. If the written operating agreement does not specify a time a member may withdraw, a member shall not

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{116} See 1994 Acts, ch. 389, § 56. This provision was based upon § 802(c) of the ABA Prototype Limited Liability Company Act, hereinafter the “Prototype.” The Prototype was drafted by a task force of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, since renamed the Committee on LLCs and Unincorporated Entities, Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, and was a primary source for the initial Kentucky LLC Act. See Thomas E. Rutledge and Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act: Understanding Kentucky’s New Organizational Option, 83 KY. L.J. 1, 55-83 (1995) (hereinafter “Rutledge and Booth, LLC Act”). The Prototype is reproduced at 3 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN AND ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (hereinafter “RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LLC’S”) APPENDIX C (2nd Ed.).

\textsuperscript{117} This lack of capital lock-in arose not from the Kintner tax classification regulations that otherwise had such an impact upon the manner in which LLC acts of that era were drafted (see Rutledge and Booth, \textit{LLC Act, supra} note 116 at 9), but was rather a carry over from the rules applicable to general and limited partnerships that served as the model for many, if not most, of the substantive aspects of LLC law.
withdraw without the consent of all other members remaining at the time.\textsuperscript{118}

After 1998, a member does not have the right to withdraw from a Kentucky LLC unless such a right is set forth in a written operating agreement or, at the time resignation is desired, all of the other members consent.\textsuperscript{119}

Having reconsidered the matter and the anomaly of a default rule under which a fiduciary may not unilaterally resign,\textsuperscript{120} the statute has been revised to provide that unless a contrary rule is set forth in a written operating agreement, a member in a member-managed LLC\textsuperscript{121} may resign

\textsuperscript{118}KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.280(3).

\textsuperscript{119}A written operating agreement may provide a threshold other than all of the members to approve, on a case by case basis, a resignation. As adopted in 1992, the Delaware LLC Act afforded a member the unilateral right to withdraw upon six months prior written notice, whereupon the former member is/was to receive the fair value of their interest in the company. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-603, 18-604 (both as prior to 1996 amendments). Although not retroactive to LLCs formed prior to the 1996 amendments (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-603), from July 31, 1996 a member of a Delaware LLC does not have a right to resign unless so provided in the operating agreement. \textit{Id.} If resignation is permitted, absent private ordering to the contrary, the member has a right to be redeemed by the company for fair value. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-604. The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("RULLCA") provides a default rule that a member may withdraw from the LLC. See RULLCA § 602(1), 6B U.L.A. 502 (2008); see also RULLCA § 601(a), 6B U.L.A. 502 (2008). Not being referred in RULLCA § 110, these provisions may be freely modified by private ordering. A dissociation by resignation will be rightful or wrongful (a wrongful dissolution is defined in RULLCA § 601(b), 6B U.L.A. 502 (2008)), and if wrongful the disassociated member is liable to the company and in certain instances the other members for the damages caused thereby. See RULLCA § 601(c), 6B U.L.A. 502 (2008). \textit{Accord} RUPA § 602(c), 6 U.L.A. 169 (2001). Upon resignation, the resigning member is a transferee of his or her own transferable interest (see RULLCA § 603(a)(3), 6B U.L.A. 504 (2008)), and on a prospective basis fiduciary duties owed as a member (see RULLCA § 603(a)(2), 6B U.L.A. 504 (2008)) and the right to participate in the LLC’s management are terminated. See RULLCA § 603(a)(1), 6B U.L.A. 504 (2008).

\textsuperscript{120}Τὴν Χάρυβδην ἐκφευγὼν τῇ Σκύλλῃ παρέκειτο ("Having escaped Charybdis I fell into Scylla"); \textsc{Erasmus of Rotterdam, The Adages of Erasmus} 83-84 (ed. William Barker) (University of Toronto Press 2001).

\textsuperscript{121}Whether the LLC in question is member- or manager-managed is a question of positive law determined by reference to the statement made in the articles of
on thirty days notice.\textsuperscript{122} In a manager-managed LLC the old rule remains in place; there is no right of resignation except and unless set forth in a written operating agreement or as a resignation is approved by all other members.\textsuperscript{123} Absent contrary private ordering,\textsuperscript{124} a member who has resigned is treated as his or her own assignee, having only the rights of an assignee.\textsuperscript{125} While the addition (readoption) of a right of withdrawal of a member in a manager-managed LLC will to some degree limit the utility of that structure for estate planning purposes, any actual impact upon valuation discounts should be minimal in that (a) upon resignation the former member becomes an assignee of his or her own membership interest having, consequently, the same (and no greater) economic rights as before the resignation,\textsuperscript{126} (b) there is no right to liquidate the interest (\textit{i.e.}, capital lock-in is retained) and (c) the impact of the change can be entirely avoided by utilizing a manager-managed, rather than a member-managed, LLC.

The reference to "former members" in KRS sections 275.310(2) and (3) have been corrected to refer to the "assignees,"\textsuperscript{127} and a reference to assignees has been added to KRS section 275.300.\textsuperscript{128}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[122] See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(1)(d); see also PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, § 401, comment.
\item[123] KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.280(3)(a), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 37.
\item[124] KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.280(3)(b), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 37.
\item[125] See also Thomas E. Rutledge, You Just Resigned – Now What? Different Paradigms for Withdrawing From a Venture, 12 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 43 (Nov./Dec. 2009).
\item[126] See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.255(1)(b); and 275.255(1)(c); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.280(1)(c). Accord OHIO CODE § 1705.12 ("[T]he withdrawing member shall be treated as if the member were an assignee of all of the member’s membership interests as of the date of withdrawal.").
\item[127] See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.255(1)(b).
\item[128] See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.310(2) as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 40 (references to "former members" deleted and replaced with "assignees"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.310(3) (same). The "former members' appeared in section 905 of the PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, upon which KRS § 275.310 was based. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.255(1)(b). This clarification addresses the assertion made in the dissent filed in Spurlock v. Begley, No. 2007-CA-002523-MR (Ky. App. Dec. 31, 2008), fn. 10.
\end{footnotes}
Mergers and Conversions

The LLC Act, KyRUPA and KyULPA have been amended as to the effect of a merger. Assuming the surviving entity is an LLC, a partnership or a limited partnership governed by, respectively, the KyLLC Act, KyRUPA or KyULPA, if the plan of merger provides for a written operating or partnership agreement, an effect of the merger is that the operating or partnership agreement becomes binding upon the members or partners in that surviving business entity.129 This addition conforms to the effect of conversion provisions.130 Further, and purely as a point of clarification, the LLC Act and KyULPA have been amended to make express that an effect of a merger is that amendments to the articles of organization/operating agreement/certificate of limited partnership of the entity surviving the merger will be effective and binding upon the members/partners.131 The ability to impose a contribution obligation on a member by an operating agreement imposed by amendment, merger or conversion is limited by the requirement that in order to be enforceable such obligations must be “set forth in a writing signed by the member.”132 While it may be argued that becoming a member of an LLC and signing an operating agreement that by amendment or by a merger approved by

While the application of KRS § 275.255(1)(d) was there ignored, the revisions made to KRS § 275.310 preclude such a reading in future controversies.

128 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.300(2)(d) as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 39. Prior to this addition, a strict reading would indicate that notwithstanding an assignee’s rights to receive the distributions that would otherwise be made to the assignor (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.255(1)(b)), a dissolving LLC may not make distributions to assignees.

129 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.365(11), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 42; id. § 362.1-906(7), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 57; id. § 362.2-1109(8), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 70.

130 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.375(2)(d) (effect of conversion into LLC); id. § 362.1-904(2)(d) (effect of conversion into partnership); and id. § 362.2-1105(2)(d) (effect of conversion into limited partnership).

131 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.365(10), created by created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 42; id. § 362.2-1109(7), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 70.

132 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.200(1). No similar statute of frauds requirement exists in KyRUPA or KyULPA.
less than all members\textsuperscript{133} could add a contribution obligation is a signed writing that satisfies KRS section 275.200(1), this is at best a strained reading and conflicts with the clear intent of the provision. Limited partners in a limited partnership, all partners in a limited liability limited partnership, and partners in a limited liability partnership may want to protect themselves from having contribution obligations imposed by including a statute of frauds in the controlling partnership agreement.

There are no vested rights under an operating, partnership or limited partnership agreement or certificate of limited partnership that cannot be modified by amendment.\textsuperscript{134} These provisions make clear that an otherwise permissible amendment of organizational documents and the terms of the deal does not implicate a vested right that is subject to protection.\textsuperscript{135}

The conversion of a partnership into an LLC will now cancel any statement of partnership authority.\textsuperscript{136} Previously, a conversion cancelled only a statement of registration or statement of qualification as an LLP. As the filing of a statement of partnership authority under a particular name created a "real name,"\textsuperscript{137} absent its automatic cancellation by the

\textsuperscript{133} See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.175(2)(a) (majority-in-interest of members may amend operating agreement); id. § 275.350(1) (majority-in-interest of members may approve merger).

\textsuperscript{134} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.003(6), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 28; id. § 362.1-103(6), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 51; id. 362.2-110(6), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 60. The LLC Act contained a similar provision that referred to only the articles of organization. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.10-010(2).

\textsuperscript{135} For example, having resigned from a partnership, a former partner (now a transferee) cannot assert a property interest in the terms of the partnership agreement as it existed as of the point of resignation and thereby "freeze" the deal even as he/she is no longer a party to that agreement. At the same time, an amendment that impacts upon a unilateral contract would not be effective.

\textsuperscript{136} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.1-303.

\textsuperscript{137} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.015(b)2.
conversion, it must be separately cancelled\textsuperscript{138} if the converted LLC is to utilize the name of the converting partnership.\textsuperscript{139}

\textit{Clarification of KRS § 275.170}

Entirely as a point of clarification and without any modification to the substantive rules already in place, KRS section 275.170(1) has been supplemented to make clear that it constitutes the statutory standard of care, set forth in terms of a standard of culpability, applicable to members and managers in an LLC. Similarly, while KRS section 275.170(2) has been supplemented to make clear that it constitutes the standard of loyalty imposed on members and managers in an LLC.\textsuperscript{140}

The need for these clarifications is due to a number of court decisions which indicate a level of confusion as to these provisions reciting the default\textsuperscript{141} standards of care and loyalty. With respect to the standard of care as recited in KRS section 275.170(1), the amendment was most directly driven by the decision rendered in \textit{Gaunce v. Wertz},\textsuperscript{142} which did not reflect a proper interpretation of the provision. The \textit{Gaunce} court failed to appreciate that in the LLC Act the standard of care is recited in terms of a standard of culpability, namely misconduct that is “wanton or reckless.” The \textit{Gaunce} court wrote that the claim was not for breach of fiduciary duty, but rather for wanton or reckless misconduct. In fact, the claim is for breach of the duty of care, but liability will only attach against the member or manager so charged if the violation was itself wanton or reckless. The Kentucky LLC Act as originally written was based primarily upon the ABA’s Prototype LLC Act,\textsuperscript{143} and KRS section

\textsuperscript{138} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.1-105(4).

\textsuperscript{139} KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.100(2).

\textsuperscript{140} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.170(1), (2), as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 32.

\textsuperscript{141} That the standards of care and loyalty may be modified in a written operating agreement is manifest from the lead-in provision of KRS § 275.170 (“Unless otherwise provided in a written operating agreement”).

\textsuperscript{142} 2009 WL 803843 (W.D. Ky. March 25, 2009).

\textsuperscript{143} See supra note 114. The statement of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in \textit{Randy Wenty and Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. Hargus Sexton}, No. 2000-CA-
275.170(1) is a verbatim adoption of section 402(A) thereof. The commentary to section 402(A) provides in part:

Subsection (A) sets forth the gross negligence standard of care for those participating in management. 144

Whether, in the first instance, the member’s or manager’s aspirational standard of care should be to avoid negligence, gross negligence or some other standard is a point not addressed in the LLC Act 145 that, should the fiduciary standard of care be modified in a written operating agreement, needs to be addressed, as well as the question of what should be the level of culpability. 146

002847-MR (Ky. App. Feb. 1, 2002) that “The Kentucky Limited Liability Company Act ... is generally similar to the model act promulgated by the Uniform Law Commissioners” is accurate only to the extent that the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA, 6B U.L.A. 545 (2008)) is similar to the Prototype. In fact ULLCA and the Prototype are more dissimilar than similar, and ULLCA was not completed until well after the 1994 LLC Act was drafted.

144 Language substantially equivalent to KRS § 275.170(1) also appears in section 409(c) of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (6B U.L.A. 598 (2009)), where it is expressly labeled a “duty of care,” a labeling that is carried forward in the comment.

145 Contrast Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.8-300(2) (defining duty of care as that of an ordinarily prudent person in a like position); id. § 362.1-404(3) (partial definition of duty of care as that of a reasonable person in a like position in similar circumstances and in the best interests of the partnership). Whether in a future session of the General Assembly an express aspirational standard of care, with presumably a gross negligence standard of culpability, should be substituted for the exact formula will need to be assessed.

146 A bifurcation of the standard of care and the standard of culpability is set forth in the Kentucky Business Corporation Act, wherein these directors’ standard of care is defined in KRS § 271B.8-300(2), informed by KRS § 271B.8-300(1), while culpability for monetary damages does not attach except as provided in KRS § 271B.8-300(5), namely upon a demonstration that the failure to satisfy the standard of care constituted “willful misconduct or wanton or reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.” See also Sahni v. Hock, 322 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. App. 2010) {No. 2007-CA-001785-MR, April 23, 2010; slip op at 14-15} (complaint that corporate director breached fiduciary duty but which did not allege director “committed willful misconduct or that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the
The formula employed in Prototype section 402(A)/KRS section 275.170(1), reciting no aspirational standard and rather only the standard of culpability, is curious, but it is clear that the standard of care is set forth in the statute. In effect, absent private ordering to the contrary, the standard of care in an LLC is the same standard as the limit of the protections provided by the Business Judgment Rule.147 Whether and when the Business Judgment Rule should apply in the contractual realm of LLCs and other unincorporated business organizations is subject to debate,148 but careful drafting of an operating agreement defining standards of care and culpability differing from KRS section 275.170(1) will avoid that issue.

With respect to the standard of loyalty set forth in KRS section 275.170(2),149 this provision is a verbatim adoption of section 402(B) of the Prototype, for which the commentary provides in part:

Subsection (B) which is based on UPA § 21, sets forth the duty of loyalty of LLC managers and managing members—that is, the duty to act without being subject to an obvious conflict of interest.

The duty of loyalty under this section is defined to include two major components: “self-dealing,” or a manager’s best interests of the corporation and its shareholders” did not “sufficiently allege a cause of action under KRS § 271B.8-300.”

147 See PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, § 402 Commentary (“This is similar to the standard commonly applied to corporate directors, managing partners, or general partners of limited partnership. In general, as long as managers avoid self-interested and grossly negligent conduct, their actions are protected by the business judgment rule.”); see also Horton v. United Light, Heat and Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 389-90 (Ky. 1985) (equating “wanton and reckless” with “gross negligence”); Turner v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (quoting Kinney v. Butcher, 131 S.W.3d 357-359 (Ky. App. 2004)); 57A AM.JUR.2D Negligence § 232.


149 Certain aspects of the following discussion have previously appeared in Thomas E. Rutledge and Professor Thomas Earl Geu, The Analytic Protocol for the Duty of Loyalty Under the Prototype LLC Act, 64 ARK. L. REV. 6 (2010).
reaping an individual profit by or through an LLC transaction in which the manager participated; and liability for appropriating for personal use property belonging to the LLC without the firm’s consent. Such appropriation would amount to, in effect, unauthorized compensation. This duty is based on the fact that LLC property is owned by the firm as a whole rather than by individual managers or members.\footnote{150}{See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.240(1).} Note that “property” is defined to include records of the LLC that are in the manager’s control. Because of the similarity of this section with the UPA,\footnote{151}{See UPA § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 194 (2001), adopted in Kentucky at KRS § 362.250(1).} it is anticipated that the courts will interpret a section such as this to impose duties similar to those in the general partnership, including the duty not to appropriate partnership opportunities.\footnote{152}{PROTOTYPE LLC ACT § 402, Commentary. Language equivalent to KRS § 275.170(2) also appears in section 409(b)(1) of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (6B U.L.A. 597 (2008)), language labeled as and described in the comment thereto as a duty of loyalty. A comparison of KRS §§ 275.170(2) and 362.250(1) make manifest that the law developed under the latter must inform the interpretation of the former.}

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<th>KRS § 362.250(1)</th>
<th>KRS § 275.170(2)</th>
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<td>Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.</td>
<td>Each member and manager shall account to the limited liability company and hold as trustee for it any profit or benefit derived by that person without the consent of more than one-half (1/2) by number of the disinterested managers, or a majority-in-interest of the members from: (a) Any transaction connected with the conduct or winding up of the limited liability company; or (b) Any use by the member or manager of its property, including, but not limited to, confidential or proprietary information of the limited liability company or other matters entrusted to the person as a result of his status as manager or member.</td>
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The clarification of KRS section 275.170(2) was driven by the decision rendered in *Patmon v. Hobbs*. As to the existence and quality of the duty of loyalty in LLCs, the *Patmon* decision is an instance of "partial right answer but wrong reason." Because it was the [impetus] for the amendment of KRS section 275.170(2), a review of the decision is worthwhile. The Kentucky LLC Act is based upon the Prototype LLC Act, and contains a verbatim adoption of Prototype section 402(B)'s duty of loyalty. In *Patmon v. Hobbs*, the Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the existence and quality of the duty of loyalty in LLCs.

Hobbs, the 51% managing-member of a member-managed LLC named American Leasing and Management, LLC ("American Leasing LLC"), purported to transfer certain build-to-suit lease agreements between that LLC and a third party to an LLC of which he was the sole owner. He did not seek approval for the transfers from the other members.

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*See also Prudential Building & Loan Ass’n v. City of Louisville, 464 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Ky. 1971).*

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153 280 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. App. 2009). The *Patmon* decision is the first published ruling of a Kentucky court addressing KRS § 275.170. This decision was not appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court. The author has not served as legal counsel, an expert witness or otherwise in this case. The unpublished ruling in *Welty v. Sexton*, No. 2000-CA-002847-MR (Ky. App. Feb. 1, 2002), addressed KRS § 275.170(2), but did not review it as the fiduciary standard of loyalty or address the remedy for a breach thereof.

154 See supra note 116.

155 In 2007, after this dispute was initiated, the Kentucky adoption of Prototype § 402(B) was amended (see Rutledge, *The 2007 Amendments*, supra note 1 at 248-49), but not in a manner relevant to this dispute. Curiously, KRS § 275.170(2), as quoted by the Court of Appeals (280 S.W.2d at 595), is the statute as it existed after its amendment in 2007, and not as it existed in 2004, while it is paraphrased (id. at 598) in its 2004 form.

156 Whether a particular LLC is member-managed or manager-managed is not determined by a substantive review and characterization of the inter-se management structure defined in the operating agreement. Rather, reference is made to the election made in the articles of organization. *See, e.g., Prototype § 202(D); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.025(1)(d).* As set forth in the comment to Prototype section 401, "Irrespective of the provisions in the operating agreement, whether an LLC is ‘manager-managed,’ as that phrase is used in the Act, depends on whether the articles of organization so provide."
of American Leasing LLC and it received nothing in consideration for
the transferred agreements. Patmon, a member of American Leasing
LLC, brought suit against Hobbs individually and in the name of the LLC.
The trial court required that Hobbs reimburse American Leasing LLC for
out-of-pocket expenditures that benefited his separate LLC, but it
determined that no damages were due the LLC consequent to Hobbs’
transfer of the build-to-suit lease agreements since the LLC was not in a
financial condition to perform on the contracts.

On Patmon’s appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that
Hobbs had violated his duty of loyalty to the LLC only after an
unfortunate and unnecessary diversion through the business corporation
act and various decisions on fiduciary duties such as Steelvest. Only
the opinion’s conclusion focused on the language of KRS section
275.170(2) and (correctly) identified it as the statutory recitation of the
standard of loyalty for Kentucky LLCs. Thereafter, the Court
determined that Hobbs had violated his duty of loyalty and was liable

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157 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(2) (addressing requirement of

158 280 S.W.3d at 592.

159 Treating, it would seem, the corporate model of fiduciary duties in general
and its duty of loyalty in particular as the normative paradigm for all business
organizations, a point of reference neither supported in the decision nor supportable in
genral. Rather, choice of entity matters. The rights, duties and obligations of
participants in different types of business structures are different depending upon the type
selected. There likely exist no normative rights and duties, with the exception of the
contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing, that apply universally to business
organizations irrespective of form.

160 Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky.

161 280 S.W.3d at 598. Consequent to this decision, KRS § 275.170(2) was
amended to expressly label it as the LLC Act’s duty of loyalty provision. See KY. REV.

162 As detailed in a leading treatise on partnership law, “A partner cannot,
without the consent of his partners, acquire for himself a partnership asset, e.g., by
substituting a contract with himself for one with the partnership.” ALAN R. BROMBERG,
CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 390 at note 59 (West 1968) (citations omitted).
“Nor may he divert to his own use or profit a ‘partnership opportunity.’” Id. at 391, note 62 (citation omitted). See also II ALAN R. BROMBERG AND LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
for damages but only after: (1) stating that Kentucky courts have not determined whether members have a duty of loyalty (notwithstanding that the statute makes it clear that they do), (2) a discussion of a possible breach of the duty of loyalty by Hobbs in the context of an LLC because he acted inconsistently with the statutory conflict of interest provision of the business corporation act, and (3) discussing whether the existence of an opportunity is dependent upon the ability of the LLC to exercise it and is therefore subject to a “futility defense.”

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163 280 S.W.3d at 593 (“In Kentucky, there is relatively little caselaw regarding limited liability companies and no caselaw concerning fiduciary duties in the limited liability company context.”). See also Purcell v. Southern Hills Instruments, LLC, 847 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind. App. 2006) (“In Indiana, there is relatively little case law regarding LLCs and no case law concerning fiduciary duties in the LLC context.”).

164 This point was recognized by the trial court, which wrote in its conclusions of law “KRS 275.170(2) creates a statutory duty of loyalty ....” American Leasing and Management, LLC v. Hobbs, 04-CI-4901, Jefferson Circuit Court, Div. 3 (Judge Perry), Sept. 24, 2007.

165 280 S.W.3d at 597. (“[W]e must determine not only that Hobbs’ activities breached the statutory standards found in KRS 275.170 and KRS 271B.8-310(1) .... ”) (emphasis added).

166 Id. at 597, 598.

167 See generally 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 862.10. Certain courts have held that the futility defense is available only in instances of full disclosure. See id., note 4 and accompanying text. This rule has been embodied in the Principles of Corporate Governance, which provide that while futility (“fairness”) may be a defense to the misappropriation of an opportunity when there has been full disclosure, it is not available in the absence of disclosure. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05(a); id. Comment to § 5.05(a) (“Section 5.05(a) sets forth the general rule requiring a director or senior executive to first offer an opportunity to the corporation before taking it for personal advantage. If the opportunity is not offered to the corporation, the director or senior executive will not have satisfied § 5.05(a).”); see also supra note 160.
The LLC in question was member-managed, and therefore Hobbs as a member owed the company a statutory duty of loyalty under the LLC Act that included the burden to not use its property for his own account. It is unnecessary to analogize the position of a member to that of other positions in other forms of business organizations, except, perhaps, to emphasize the differences in the comparative statutory provisions which govern them. Moreover, in some circumstances, analogy to other entity statutes is not only unhelpful but confusing. While it may be fair to state that corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and that partners owe duties to the partnership, it does not follow that “being similar to Kentucky partnerships and corporations,” LLCs impose fiduciary obligations upon their “officers and members.” Rather, it is the LLC Act as modified by the operating agreement and supplemented by other private ordering that ab initio imposes defined obligations. At least initially, the Patmon court based the determination that Hobbs was a fiduciary to American Leasing LLC on his statutory agency on behalf of the LLC. While it is

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168 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.

169 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(2).

170 280 S.W.2d at 594 (“For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Kentucky [LLCs], being similar to Kentucky partnerships and corporations, impose a common-law fiduciary duty on their officers and members in the absence of contrary provisions in the [LLC] operating agreement.”). Statements of this nature are troubling in that they fail to identify the basis upon which the purported analogy relies. For example, if LLC members are similar to corporate shareholders, how can it be concluded that the former are fiduciaries – Kentucky courts have not adopted Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Corp. or § 7.01(d) of the PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, either imposing fiduciary obligations upon shareholders qua shareholders. The analogy would suggest that members are not fiduciaries, an analogy that must fail as the LLC Act provides expressly, in a member-managed LLC, that members are fiduciaries.

171 280 S.W.2d at 594-95.

172 Id. at 295.

173 Id.

174 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.170(1), (2); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170 (“Unless otherwise provided in a written operating agreement”).

175 280 S.W.3d at 594 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.135(1) (PROTOTYPE § 301(A))).
accurate that in a member-managed LLC a member enjoys apparent agency authority on behalf of the LLC\textsuperscript{176} and that all else being equal an agent bears a fiduciary duty to the principal,\textsuperscript{177} the accurate statement is that a member in a member-managed LLC owes the duties required by the controlling agreement and the LLC Act and, to the extent not already addressed thereby, general agency law.\textsuperscript{178} For example, under agency law, an agent is held to a care standard of simple negligence\textsuperscript{179} while under the LLC Act, a member is held to a standard of wanton or reckless misconduct.\textsuperscript{180} Both agents and LLC members must observe standards of loyalty, but the LLC Act is the primary source of the conduct and liabilities of a member.\textsuperscript{181} It is at best incomplete to say that the fiduciary standards applicable to members in a member-managed LLC first arise from the default status of being an agent for the company without careful statutory and factual analysis. It needs to be recognized that member fiduciary duties can be modified or even eliminated by the operating agreement.

Hobbs owed a duty of loyalty, imposed and defined by statute, to the LLC of which he was a member.\textsuperscript{182} In this case the statutory duty

\textsuperscript{176} See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.135(1) ("(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, every member shall be an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its business or affairs . . . .").

\textsuperscript{177} See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01.

\textsuperscript{178} For example, while on a prospective basis a member's fiduciary obligations will terminate upon ceasing to be a member (see, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.280(3)), a former member may not then utilize trade secrets learned in the course of being a member against and in competition with the LLC.

\textsuperscript{179} See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.08.


\textsuperscript{182} The LLC Act does not impose a fiduciary duty of good faith upon the participants in an LLC. While the common law of partnerships treated good faith as a fiduciary duty, no inclusion of that concept was made in the LLC Act. Moreover, in modern business organization acts, good faith is treated as a contractual, and not a fiduciary, obligation. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.1-404(4); id. § 362.2-408(4). To the extent good faith exists as a fiduciary, and not a contractual, obligation, as
appears not to have been modified in a written operating agreement, but it is not clear that determination was ever found as a matter of fact in the case. 183 It is against that background that his conduct must be assessed.

American Leasing LLC was in the build-to-suit leasing business. After determining the real estate needs of a prospective tenant it would enter into a contract to buy the location, build a structure according to the lessee’s specifications, and lease the property to the lessee. The LLC had performed on at least one agreement with O’Reilly Auto Parts and was negotiating three additional agreements with O’Reilly. The Patmon court described those agreements as “pending”184 when Hobbs directed that they be modified to wholly substitute the name of his separate LLC. But for one other point of modification, nothing else (it would appear) needed to be done before the contracts were executed.185 It is a stretch of credibility to treat a deal so near closing as being a mere opportunity rather than a current asset, a point of distinction not relevant under the applicable duty of loyalty.

Another factual matter was curiously not addressed by either the trial court or the Court of Appeals, a “consent resolution and agreement” of the members of the LLC was in evidence and was referenced by the Court of Appeals.186 Interestingly, that document provides that any member may have other business activities, even those that complete with

interpreted by the Delaware Courts, it is integrated as a “subsidiary element” of the duty of loyalty. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).

183 While the opinion references an “Executive/Partnership Agreement,” (280 S.W.3d at 591, 594) and indicates that it somehow addressed Hobbs’ duty of loyalty, (id. at 594 (“This duty [of loyalty] is confirmed in the Executive/Partnership Agreement drafted and signed by Hobbs”), its contents are never expanded upon. This agreement was an exhibit to the Appellant’s (Patmon’s) brief to the Court of Appeals.

184 280 S.W.3d at 592.

185 An O’Reilly representative testified that he was prepared to sign the agreements with the LLC. Id. at 592.

186 Id. at 591. This document was filed as an exhibit to the Appellants’ (Patmon’s) Brief to the Court of Appeals.
the company, "with the exception of O'Reilly Auto Parts, Inc." The O'Reilly relationship was singled out as belonging to the LLC in a document given legal efficacy for other purposes. It was only pursuant to Hobbs' authority as the "managing member" of the LLC that he was able to direct that the agreements be executed in the name of his separate LLC. His only available argument was that because of American Leasing LLC's financial lack of capacity to perform thereon, the agreements with O'Reilly were somehow not those of the LLC.

As previously detailed, the duty of loyalty in a Kentucky LLC developed under partnership law and provides that the expropriation of the opportunity gives rise to the obligation to disgorge all of the benefits derived therefrom irrespective of the ability of the venture to directly exploit the opportunity. The violation of the duty to the LLC is the

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187 This provision of the Consent Resolutions and Agreement, which otherwise appointed Hobbs the "President" and the "managing Member" of American Leasing LLC, provides in full:

FURTHER RESOLVED, that this agreement shall not be construed to require the continued or full time services of any member and each member is free to pursue such other business opportunities as he may determine in his own best interest with the exception of O'Reilly Auto Parts Inc., including without limitation, any business or venture that may be competitive with the Company.

188 While Hobbs was the "managing-member," American Leasing, LLC, consequent to the terms of its articles of organization, remained member-managed. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.

189 See 280 S.W.3d at 597 (by relying on the LLC's alleged inability to perform on the O'Reilly agreements, Hobbs implicitly acknowledged that they were otherwise LLC assets).

190 See J. WILLIAM CALLISON AND MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.8 ("If an opportunity belongs to a partnership and it is not presented to it, the courts generally hold the usurping partner accountable for all profits derived from the opportunity, even when the partner argues that the partnerships did not have access to the funds or other resources with which to pursue the opportunity if it had been so offered to it."); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 40 at § 6.07(d), text at note 83 ("If an opportunity is deemed to belong to the partnership, the courts will usually hold the usurping partners accountable (unless the other partners were aware of the opportunity and turned it down), even if the defendant claims that the partnership would have been unable or unwilling to take advantage of the opportunity if it had been offered."); 2 CARTER G. BISHOP AND DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES - TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 10.03[1][a][v] ("The 'account for"
taking of the opportunity irrespective of the LLC's capacity to perform. That is, it is the action, not the damages that is the focus of the duty of loyalty. It is on this point that the Patmon opinion most clearly fails. Having determined that Hobbs diverted LLC property for his own benefit,\(^{191}\) the Court imposed upon Patmon the burden of demonstrating that the LLC had or could acquire the capacity to perform on the agreements.\(^ {192}\) The two positions are irreconcilable – the build-to-suit lease agreements cannot be both assets of the LLC diverted by Hobbs in violation of his fiduciary obligations\(^ {193}\) and assets only if Patmon is able to

\footnotesize{\textbf{ statues therefore have dramatic implications for self-dealing transactions. If the transaction has been completed and the person with managerial authority has profited, that person must either show the required consent or disgorge all profits. It is generally no defense that the transaction was fair to the [LLC].") (citations omitted); 1 Ribstein and Keatinge on LLCs, supra note 114 at § 9.3, p. 9-12 ("A manager may not appropriate for personal use property belonging to the LLC without the firm's informed and disinterested consent.") (citations omitted). As detailed in a leading treatise on partnership law, "A partner cannot, without the consent of his partners, acquire for himself a partnership asset, e.g., by substituting a contract with himself for one with the partnership." Alan R. Bromberg, Crane and Bromberg on Partnership 390 at note 59 (West 1968) (citations omitted). "Nor may he divert to his own use or profit a 'partnership opportunity.'" Id. at 391, note 62 (citation omitted). See also Bromberg & Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 160 at § 6.07(c) (listing, as an example of taking an unauthorized benefit from partnership property "taking over a partnership contract") (citations omitted); Mason v. Underhill, No. 2006-CA-002144-MR (Ky. App. May 5, 2008) (quoting 59A Partnership AM. JUR.2D § 295 (2003) for the proposition a "partner has a duty to share with the partnership those business opportunities clearly related to the subject of its operations.").

\(^{191}\) 280 S.W.3d at 597 ("[T]he trial court has already determined that Hobbs' diversion of the O'Reilly build-to-suit lease projects was indeed a corporate opportunity of [the LLC] that he diverted for his own use.").

\(^{192}\) Id. at 598 ("[I]t is still necessary for Patmon to establish that [the LLC] had the financial wherewithal to undertake the O'Reilly project.") See also id. at 599 ("Finally, Patmon will be able to present evidence as to whether [the LLC] could have taken advantage of the business opportunity of the O'Reilly build-to-suit leases.").

\(^{193}\) Id. ("Thus, we remand this case to the trial court to determine a remedy for Hobbs' common-law breach of fiduciary duty and failure to follow the statutory guidelines of KRS 275.170. Pursuant to KRS 275.170, at a minimum, Hobbs is required to hold in trust all benefits and profits derived by him as the result of his misuse of the build-to-suit leases.").}
demonstrate the capability to perform. Hobbs violated his duty of loyalty; the analysis should turn immediately to the question of damages and other relief. Were financial capability to perform an element of the duty of loyalty it would go to the question of whether company property has been appropriated — if capacity is a factor in defining what is the property, and capacity is lacking, then there has been no property and no breach of loyalty for having appropriated same. It appears that the Court of Appeals made ability to perform an element of the proof of damages, i.e., if the LLC could not perform it lost out on nothing. This implication, however, conflicts with the court’s recognition that the contracts had value even if the LLC could not perform thereon. Even if

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194 *Id.* at 596 ("One theory of this [opportunity] doctrine holds that opportunity does not exist for a business if the business if financially unable to undertake the opportunity.").

195 *Id.* at 598 ("[W]e remand this case to the trial court to determine a remedy for Hobbs’s (sic) common-law breach of fiduciary duty and failure to follow the statutory guidelines of KRS 275.170").

196 *Id.* at 596 ("In Kentucky, however, the focus is on the fiduciary’s duty — not the lost opportunity."). The Patman decision does not consider whether the futility defense of financial incapacity is even available absent disclosure. *See supra* note 143.

197 *Id.* at 598 ("Further, a possibility exists that [the LLC] could have sold its business opportunity to another venture and profited in that manner."). *See also* 1 RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LLCS, *supra* note 114 at § 9.3, p. 9-15 ("Even if the firm cannot engage in the activity [due to financial inability], it should at least have the opportunity to obtain and sell an option or information about the activity to a third party or to the manager.") Not have otherwise pursued, is the observation that this case may be characterized as one of waste rather than as one of breach of loyalty by the appropriation of a company asset. "Waste" occurs when a venture "is caused to effect a transaction on terms that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment could conclude represent a fair exchange." *See Steiner v. Meyerson*, 1995 WL 441999, *1* (Del. Ch. July 18, 1995), 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 320, 324 (1995). In another formulation waste is "a transfer of corporate assets that serves no corporate purpose." or for which "no consideration at all is received." *See Brehm v. Eisner*, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000); *see also* Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del.Ch. 1997). While typically seen in the context of corporations, waste can also occur (and is equally actionable) in the context of a partnership. *See, e.g.*, *In re Dissolution of Demoville Partnership*, 26 So.3d 366 (Miss. App. 2009) ("Margaret allowed [Margie Allen] to waste partnership assets at a time when she knew her mother was suffering from dementia, which included impaired judgment and memory."); *In re Matter of the Estate of William Brandt*, 81 A.D.2d 268, 279 (N.Y. 1981) ("We are also of the view that the trusts, as a limited partner, have standing to complain of a waste and diversion of partnership assets which results in a diminution of
lack of capacity to perform were a factor in determining the existence, as
to the venture, of the property, the burden of demonstration must be upon
the agent and not upon the principal.\textsuperscript{198}

The LLC in question was owned 51\% by Hobbs, 44\% by Patman
and 5\% by Gray,\textsuperscript{199} and therefore the approval of a transaction that would
otherwise violate Hobbs' duty of loyalty was vested in Patman.\textsuperscript{200}
Nonetheless, Hobbs never presented the question to the other members so
there was never even the opportunity for them to consent.\textsuperscript{201} While Hobbs
had the right, his duty of loyalty having been modified by the consent
resolution, to engage in activities competitive with those of the LLC, that
right did not extend to the relationship with O'Reilly.\textsuperscript{202} In summary, the

the value of the partnership itself with consequent effect upon the trusts' interest
(upholding arbitrator's determination that majority of partners engaged in waste of
partnership assets by means of a below market lease agreement). It is uncontroversed that
Hobbs' act of transferring to his own LLC the O'Reilly contracts was not for the purpose
of advancing American Leasing LLC and that it received no consideration for that
transfer. Another possible approach would be a claim for conversion (\textit{see Ky Ass'n of
Counties All Lines Fund Trust v. McLendon}, 157 S.W.3d 626, 632 n. 12 (Ky. 2005)
(reciting the elements of a claim for conversion)) by the LLC against Hobbs with the
element of a demand for return either abated or waived under the doctrine of adverse
domination (\textit{see Wilson v. Payne}, 288 S.W.3d. 284 (Ky. 2009)) until suit was brought.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{See supra} note 159; \textit{see also Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch}, 73 F.2d 121
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1934) ("If fiduciaries are permitted to justify their conduct on the theory
that, by reason of its financial straits, the corporation could not make the purchase as
proposed, and that the fiduciaries should therefore be permitted to assume a position in
which their individual interests might be in conflict with those of the corporation, "there
will be a temptation to refrain from exerting their strongest efforts on behalf of the
corporation since, if it does not meet the obligations, an opportunity of profit will be open
to them personally."); \textit{Northeast Harbor Gold Club, Inc. v. Harris}, 661 A.2d 1146, 1149
(Me. 1995) ("Reliance on financial ability will also act as a disincentive to corporate
executives to solve corporate financing and other problems.").

\textsuperscript{199} 280 S.W.3d at 592.

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.} § 275.170(2) (conflict of interest may be waived
by majority-in-interest of the disinterested members).

\textsuperscript{201} 280 S.W.3d at 595 ("Hobbs concedes and the court found that he never
obtained consent from any member of [the LLC]").

\textsuperscript{202} \textit{See supra} note 179 and accompanying text.
LLC Act provided Hobbs’ conduct could have been excluded from his duty of loyalty in the operating agreement or sanctioned by the other members. Hobbs chose neither of these avenues. Consequently, he violated his duty of loyalty in expropriating to his own benefit company property.

The determination that Hobbs violated his KRS section 275.170(2) duty of loyalty was correct, as was the predicate conclusion that the O’Reilly contracts were company property. The question should then have turned immediately to the matter of remedy. Initially Hobbs is obligated to surrender to the LLC all profits and benefits derived from the diverted contracts. Hobbs should not be able to reduce the amount owed by identifying proceeds that were diverted to others he brought into his new venture; the fruits of the expropriation should not be reduced by the value of gain transferred to other actors. A claim for attorney fees has substantial authority as does a claim for punitive damages. While the Court of Appeals suggested that the trial court, in dissolving the LLC and distributing its net assets among the members, could adjust the sharing ratios among the members, it cited no authority for doing so.

203 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(2) ("shall account to the [LLC] and hold as trustee for it ….").

204 Id. at 592 ("Subsequently, Hobbs and Steve Habeeb (Habeeb) formed another [LLC] which was eventually assigned these leases. The company was started so that Hobbs would provide the leases and Habeeb would obtain the financing for the projects.").


206 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.

207 See supra note 205 and accompanying text; see also Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 487 ("Accordingly, we determine, as a matter of law, that a breach of fiduciary duty is equivalent to fraud.").

208 280 S.W.3d at 599.

209 See also supra note 203.
so pursuant to the court’s equitable power avoids other issues previously identified.210

A request has been made to the Revisor of Statutes to change the heading of KRS section 275.170 to “Duties of Care and Loyalty; Approval of Conflict of Interest Transactions.”211

Miscellaneous Revisions

The provision addressing the conversion of a corporation into an LLC has been revised only to address a grammatical error,212 while in KyULPA an erroneous cross-reference has been addressed in KRS section 362.2-110(2)(d). A Dartmouth College provision has been added to KyULPA.213 The revisions made to KRS section 275.225 make express that an improper distribution includes one that violates the operating agreement214 and clarifies that it is not the LLC that determines that a distribution is proper, but rather the member or manager acting on its behalf.215 The LLC Act has been amended to make express that an assignor member does not vote with respect to whether their assignee should be admitted as a member in the LLC, it being express that this rule may be modified in the Articles of Organization or a written operating agreement.216 The correction in KRS section 275.365(4) of “chooses” for

210 See supra notes __ through ___ and accompanying text.
211 The title of the section does not alter its effect. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.140.
212 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.376(11)(d) (substituting “or” in place of “and”).
216 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.225(2) as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 34.
217 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.265(1) as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 33. Accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 18-702(a)(1) (providing a default rule of approval of all incumbent members of the LLC to the admission of assignee as a member but
“choices” addresses a typographical error that has existed since the adoption of the LLC Act in 1994. Being in conflict with the Assumed Name statute and specifically KRS section 365.015(8), the provision requiring that a corporation converting into an LLC cancel its assumed names, has been deleted.\(^{218}\) In conformity with KyRUPA and KyULPA,\(^{219}\) the LLC Act has been amended to exempt LLCs from the reach of KRS section 381.135.\(^{220}\) The LLC Act has been further amended without the necessity of approval from “the member assigning the limited liability company interest”). With this revision, it remains the right of the incumbent members other than the assignor to determine whether they are willing to be members with the assignee. When this provision was originally drafted in 1994, it was provided that the unanimous consent of the members was required to admit an assignee as a member. That provision was amended in 1998, and that voting threshold was dropped to majority-in-interest. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.265(1) as amended by 1998 Acts, ch. 341, § 36. With this modification, in certain scenarios, the members lost the ability to determine with whom they would be in business. For example, in an LLC owned 70% by a single member and with the balance of 30% spread amongst three otherwise equal members, the 70% owner could unilaterally assign a 10% interest to a third-party and then, exercising the majority vote unilaterally cause the assignee to be admitted as a member of the company. With this revision, such an outcome, absent of provision to the contrary in the Articles of Organization or a written operating agreement, could not take place. This amendment to KRS § 275.265(1) introduces parallelism with KRS § 275.280(1)(c)2, which provides that the assignor member does not vote with respect to whether they will, consequent to the assignment of all of their interests in the LLC, be removed as a member. See also Thomas E. Rutledge, Assigning Membership Interests: Consequences to the Assignor and Assignee, 12 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 35 (July/Aug. 2009).

\(^{218}\) KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.376 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 44.

\(^{219}\) See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.1-402(2); id. § 362.2-506(2).

\(^{220}\) See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.220(3), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 33. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.240(1) (members have no property right in property owned by LLC). When KRS § 275.240(1) is read in concert with Mills v. Mills, No. 2007-CA-000774-MR (Ky. App. Oct. 24, 2008), it is clear that KRS § 381.135, absent private ordering to the contrary, should not apply to LLCs. Pursuant to a written operating agreement an LLC may elect into the application of KRS § 381.135. Whether, absent this carve-out, the property of a farm LLC was ever subject to the partition provisions of KRS § 381.135 is open to question. By its terms, KRS § 381.135 is applicable to a “farm corporation or partnership.” The definition of a “corporation” may include a “company” (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(8)), the definition of a “company” may include a “person” (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(7)), and the definition of a “person” may include a “limited liability company.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(27). Whether such a tortured stroll through definitions is appropriate is open to debate. Further, KRS § 381.135(1)(a)1 was added in 1998, after the adoption of the
to expressly authorize provisions in an operating agreement affording rights to third-parties and it has been made express that a contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing exists in each operating agreement. A new section has been added to the Business Corporation Act providing that a special meeting of the board of directors may be called by judicial order upon an application filed by at least one-third the incumbent number of directors. The Nonprofit Corporation Act has been amended to make express that the member's right to inspect corporate records encompasses as well a right to copy those records and

LLC Act, and as that amendment did not include a reference to an LLC, including the LLC within the scope of the provision would violate principles of statutory construction. See also Thomas E. Rutledge and R. David Lester, Recent Developments in the Valuation of Farm Properties, 5 The Ky. CPA J. 17 (2010).

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.003(3), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 28. A provision of this nature could provide, for example, that for as long as a loan from a particular lender is outstanding, the operating agreement may not be amended. While a covenant of this nature is often part of the loan documentation, its violation is typically an event of default under the note, and the lender's remedies are as set forth in the loan documentation. Contained in the operating agreement, the purported amendment is void ab initio (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.177), no default takes place, and the operating agreement remains in place.

See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.003(7), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 28. Accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.1-404(4); id. § 362.2-305(2); id. § 362.2-408(4). See also Farmers Bank and Trust Co. of Georgetown, Kentucky v. Willmott Hardwoods, Inc., 171 S.W.3d 4, 11 (Ky. 2005) ("Within every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and contracts impose on the parties thereto a duty to do everything necessary to carry them out.").

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.003(3), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 28. Accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.003(3), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 2. While previously the Business Corporation Act provided a mechanism by which the shareholders could apply to the court to call a special meeting of the shareholders, there existed no equivalent provision with respect to calling a meeting of the directors. A similar provision has been added to the Nonprofit Corporation Act. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273.223(2), created by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 16.

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273.233 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 17. This amendment brings the Nonprofit Corporation Act into parallelism with the other acts, all of which provide that the right of review includes a right to copy. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273.16-020(1) ("entitled to inspect and copy"); id. § 273.042 (adopting the rule of KRS § 271B.16-020); id. § 275.185 ("may . . . inspect and copy"); id. § 362.2-403(2) ("inspect and copy"); id. § 362.2-407(1) ("inspect and copy"). This addition to the statute is a clarification of the statutory formula; even without it the right of inspection carried with it the right to copy. See, e.g., 18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations §
that the right of inspection is not subject to limitation by the articles of incorporation or the bylaws.\textsuperscript{225} The filing fee for a foreign business trust applying for a certificate of authority has been set at $100.\textsuperscript{226} A company does not “file” an annual report; that is the task of the Secretary of State after the submitted document is reviewed.\textsuperscript{227} Rather, a company delivers an annual report for filing. “Deliver,” as contrasted with “file,” for a business organization’s obligation to submit an annual report is now consistent across the various acts.\textsuperscript{228} The provisions addressing annual reports filed by corporations have been revised to make explicit that the report must list the Secretary of the corporation; a tendered report that does not list a Secretary is “incorrect” and will be returned for correction and resubmission.\textsuperscript{229} Foreign corporations not utilizing the MBCA

\textsuperscript{225} This language is drawn from KRS § 271B.16-020(4).

\textsuperscript{226} KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.4426. That same $100 fee applies each time the foreign business trust seeks to amend its certificate of authority. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.4428(3).

\textsuperscript{227} See also Rutledge, The 2007 Amendments, supra note 1 at 253, note 163.

\textsuperscript{228} See e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.440 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 45; id. § 362.1-121 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 53; id. § 362.2-809 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 64; id. § 386.4444 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 75. Effective January 1, 2011 those provisions were superseded by KRS § 14A.6-050, created by 2010 Acts, ch. 151, § 34.

\textsuperscript{229} Every business corporation organized in the Commonwealth of Kentucky is required to have a “secretary,” that being the title assigned to the person responsible “for preparing minutes of the directors’ and shareholders’ meetings and for authenticating records of the corporation.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-400(3) (requirement to have the officer); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.1-400(23) (defining the “secretary” and referencing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-400(3)). There exists no statutory requirement that a corporation have a president, a treasurer or any of the other typically seen officers. Each domestic and each foreign business corporation is required, on an annual basis, to file and annual report with the Secretary of State. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.16-220(1). Prior to the most recent amendments, the information required in the annual report included “The names and business addresses of its directors and principal
formula (i.e., not requiring the designation of a "secretary") should identify the person having the custody of and capacity to authenticate the records of the corporation. The requirement that documents filed on behalf of a "private corporation" with a county clerk bear a scrivener block has been deleted.

While the statute describes what appears to be a substantially an inter-se role for the secretary (i.e., the preparation and maintenance of director and shareholder minutes), it is clear from the definition of the office that the role of secretary also affects the relationship of the corporation to third parties through the capacity to authenticate corporate records (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.1-400(23), 271B.8-400(3)), the provision that the secretary of the corporation serves as an alternative agent for receipt of service of process (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.5-040(2)) and that they are as well the agent of the corporation for receipt of any other notice to be given it. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.1-410(4). In addition to that role, the corporate secretary has an important role in receiving service of process. When a corporation either has no registered agent or that agent cannot be with reasonable diligence served, the KyBCA provides that service of process may be made on "the secretary of the corporation at its principal office" by either registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.5-040(2). Rejecting annual reports that do not identify the corporate secretary:

1. Serves a prophylactic benefit in that it identifies corporations that are otherwise violating the Business Corporation Act by not having a secretary; and

2. Benefits third parties who may need to make service upon the corporate secretary when the registered agent is not able to be served or need to otherwise give notice to the corporation.

See MBCA § 1.40(20) (defining the person discharging the MBCA § 8.40(c) obligations as the "secretary"). For example, while a Tennessee corporation is not required to designate a "secretary," that not being a defined term (see TENN. CODE § 48-11-201), it is required to have an officer to whom is delegated "responsibility for preparing minutes of the directors' and shareholders' meetings and for authenticating records of the corporation." See TENN. CODE § 48-18-401(c).

See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.335(1), as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 72. The reasons for this deletion are twofold. Initially, what is a "private corporation" is less than clear, as such could, conceivably, include business organizations that are not incorporated. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(8) (defining a "corporation" as including, based upon the context, a "company, partnership, joint stock company or
There was introduced to the 2010 Kentucky General Assembly a proposal that Kentucky authorize the formation of the so called “low-profit limited liability company” or “L3C.”\textsuperscript{232} In light of the significant controversy that exists with respect to the utility and effectiveness of the L3C structure,\textsuperscript{233} S.B. 150 was amended by the House Judiciary Committee to provide that the interim committee, working in concert with various stake holders, would review the issue and prepare a recommendation for the 2011 General Assembly.\textsuperscript{234}

\textbf{Revisions to the Kentucky Uniform Principal and Income Act}

At the time of its adoption, the Kentucky Uniform Principal and Income Act defined “entity” to include a “partnership,” but did not

\textsuperscript{232} H.B. 371, introduced February 3, 2010.

\textsuperscript{233} After its introduction, Representative Flood was kind enough to spend significant time meeting with the author to review concerns with and criticism of the L3C. Examples of that criticism include: David Edward Spenard, \textit{Panacea or Problem: A State Regulator’s Perspective on the L3C Model}, 65 \textit{Exempt Organization Tax Review} 131 (February, 2010); J. William Callison, \textit{L3Cs: Useless Gadgets?}, 19 ABA \textit{Business Law Today} 55 (Nov./Dec. 2009); Carter G. Bishop, \textit{The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?}, \textit{Suffolk University Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper} 10-09 (Feb. 12, 2010); David S. Chernoff, \textit{L3Cs: Less Than Meets the Eye}, 22 \textit{Taxation of Exempts} 3 (May/June 2010).

\textsuperscript{234} 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 78 (not codified in Kentucky Revised Statutes). On April 23, 2010, the Committee on LLCs, Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities, Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, passed a resolution against further state adoption of L3C legislation. The proposed form of that resolution was set forth in XXVII \textit{PUBOGRAM} 5 (April, 2010).
reference the limited partnership. This was entirely appropriate as, at that point in time, every limited partnership was also a partnership.235 However, with the adoption of KyRUPA and KyULPA, limited partnerships are now a distinct body and do not fall within the definition of a partnership.236 For that reason, the Kentucky adoption of the Uniform Principal and Income Act has been amended to expressly add the “limited partnership” within the definition of “entity,” thereby precluding an argument that the Act does not extend to limited partnerships.237 That same section has been revised as well to include within the definition of an “entity” a statutory or business trust.238

S.B. 152 and the Readoption of the 2007 Business Entity Law Amendments

In 2007, the Kentucky General Assembly, with H.B. 334,239 enacted a broad series of amendments across Kentucky’s various business entity acts, which amendments were largely driven by an effort to rationalize and make consistent similar provisions across business entity laws.240 On the last day of the session, the bill came up before the entire Senate, where it was amended on the Senate floor to add in the substance

235 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.175(2), 362.401(8).

236 See Allan W. Vestal and Thomas E. Rutledge, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) Comes to Kentucky: An Owner’s Manual, 67 N. KY. L. REV. 411, 417 (2007). This statement is correct as far as KyRUPA (KRS ch. 362.1) and KyULPA (KRS ch. 362.2) are related. However, the definition of “partnership” set forth at KRS § 446.010(24), which defines a “partnership” as including both a general and a limited partnership, could be applied notwithstanding KRS § 362.1-202(2) and its rejection of limited partnerships from its scope.

237 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.466(1).

238 KRS § 386.466(5) has been corrected by the Revision of the Statutes to add the “tax” that was inadvertently left out of the provision when it was otherwise adopted verbatim from the uniform act. This correction was made on September 9, 2008, and is included in KRS § 386.466 as amended by 2010 Acts, ch. 133, § 76. Additional 2010 revisions to the Kentucky Uniform Income and Principal Act were continued in H.B. 188 (2010 Acts, ch. 21). See also James E. Hargrove, 2010 Changes to the Kentucky Trust & Estate Practice, 74 BENCH & BAR 12 (Sept. 2010).


240 See Rutledge, The 2007 Amendments, supra note 1 at 229.
of the provisions that it previously appeared in 2007 H.B. 181. As part of these additions, unfortunately, a bill devoted to the laws governing business entities and up until then so titled received as well a title amendment, to the effect that it was now “A bill dealing with post-secondary education.” Ultimately the House concurred in the amended bill, including with the now flawed title.

In response to this mistake, the substantive provisions of 2007 H.B. 223 have been reenacted.\footnote{2010 Acts, ch. 51. This Act was introduced by Senator Jensen as S.B. 152. It was assigned to the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 10, 2010 and hearings took place on February 11. The bill was voted out of committee on a unanimous vote. The bill came before the entire Senate on February 24, 2010 when it received the unanimous approval of all thirty-eight Senators. On March 10, 2010, in concert with Senate Bills 150 and 151, the bill was by a unanimous vote approved by the House Judiciary Committee. The bill was voted out of the House on March 18 on a vote of 96 in favor and one against. It was signed by Governor Beshear on March 31, 2010.} In addition to the reenactment of the substantive provisions of the 2007 legislation, the 2010 legislation makes clear that these provisions are to be applied as of June 26, 2007, that having been the effective date of the 2007 legislation.\footnote{2010 Acts, ch. 51 §§ 180, 181 and 183. See also KY. OP. ATT’Y. GEN. 002 (2007).}